THE VANQUISHED GENERALS AND
THE LIBERATION WAR OF BANGLADESH
MUNTASSIR MAMOON
1
The Genocide in the Eyes of Pakistanis,
and Other Issues
What did happen in Bangladesh between March and December 1971?
Those aged forty or above know very well, as did the whole world. The
murderous activities carried out by the Pakistan Army and the heroics of
the freedom fighters were discussed everywhere in the world, except in
one place - Pakistan.
It sounds unbelievable, but if this is true then it is easy to guess their
attitude towards Bangalis - which is that they could not care less about
us. But let us not go to such extremes. The Pakistan Army had tried to
keep under grips the erstwhile East Pakistan, and they did whatever was
required for it. In their words, they needed the land and not the people. It
is unimaginable that no one in Pakistan know this. I have discussed this
with many of the policy makers of that time, and also with common
people. There was no straight answer to it; the replies went like - 1. I
knew what was going on, or, 2. I knew some of what was going on and
not everything, or, 3. I knew nothing [actually he knew but refuses to
admit that now].
Most of those I talked to during my recent visit to Pakistan, even
'responsible' persons, told me that the common men in Pakistan did not
know what was happening in Bangladesh in 1971. What could be the
reason for such ignorance? The answers are -
1. State propaganda and 2. Complete censorship.
The Urdu newspapers of Pakistan were always against the Bangalis and
most of the times they attempted to present a negative picture of the
Bangalis to the West Pakistanis. Bangalis and Sheikh Mujib were
portrayed as a race and a leader who wanted to break up Pakistan and
who were collaborating with India to achieve their goal. The very thought
of this was like blasphemy in Pakistan. So, the general opinion is that
Yahya Khan did the right thing in 1971.
Actually, the people of Pakistan have grown up in a feudal society where
they only obey and do not question about anything. They always accept
at face value what the state propaganda machinery tells them. After
March 25, 1971, the mass media completely blacked out the terrible
incidents in East Pakistan. On December 16, they were out of their mind
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when they saw on TV General Niazi surrendering. The awfully revered
Army were on their knees and surrendering to the Indians and Bangalis!
This news and the image created such a reaction all over the country that
it was never shown in Pakistan again.
One can question, did not the middle class in Pakistan have any radio in
the days between March and December 1971? They had, but they were
not interested in any other frequency except their own. We must also
keep in mind that the West Pakistanis were never so worried about
Pakistan Qaom as were the Bangalis. By Pakistan they understood only
West Pakistan. They never had any second thought about it, and so they
did not have any scruples while carrying out the genocide here in 1971.
We, on the other hand, did have our misgivings, for which we had to
suffer.
We were talking to Brigadier (Rtd.) A. R. Siddiqi, who was in 1971 the
Director of Public Relations of the Pakistan Army, in Karachi. He was
explaining that in 1971 the government was eager to give the impression
that everything was normal in East Pakistan, and was driving its
propaganda machine for that purpose. The rulers had no idea that the
events of March 25 would generate such a strong and adverse reaction all
over the world. The government was on one hand saying that everything
was going on as usual and on the other hand disseminating reports of
skirmishes with, and subsequent chastening of, "miscreants". No one
cared about the contradictions among these messages. The average West
Pakistani was convinced that the Army deserved praise for doing a great
job in East Pakistan. In his recent book, Brigadier Siddiqi writes, "Most
people in the West wing sang hosannas to him [the soldier] and wished
him all the luck and success in his mission".
Siddiqi also says in his book that in 1971 the image of the Army got
bifurcated - they were heroes in one part of Pakistan, and instruments of
oppression in the other. In his words, "Psychologically, the soldier
acquired a kind of schizophrenia by fighting against the people he was
supposed to stand by and defend. Professionally, he suffered from doubt
about his own ability to fight a counter insurgency operation for which he
had never been trained. In propaganda alone did he feel secure and
vindicated".
Yahya himself initiated this line of propaganda. In his speeches he used
to accuse the Bangalis who wanted freedom as qafirs, implying that the
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Pakistan Army was actually fighting against forces opposing Islam. The
Army personnel were mujahids. Someone becomes a mujahid by
fighting a jihad, or holy war. Was there any option but to exalt these
mujahids?
What was the opinion of the more educated class, those who were
involved with the government? Did they ever know of any genocide
going on here in 1971? No----.Well yes, there was something happening,
may be a few people died, they say, but the Biharis and Pakistanis were
slaughtered mercilessly (This was given much importance in the
government-published white papers).
The defence strategy adopted by those involved in formulating the
policies that led to the events in Bangladesh was - the Biharis were being
indiscriminately slaughtered in East Pakistan from March, making the
Pakistani troops feel that they were living in enemy territory. This may
have incited them to overdo on March 25. I have asked those who gave
this explanation, "If the slaughtering of the Biharis was going on like
that, then why wasn't it covered in the foreign press? There was no
Bangladesh Government then". They could not give any answer, because
there was no answer. But they continue to putup this story to cover up the
issue of genocide.
Their lies and distortions of truth are being exposed in a different way.
To defend their position, they are writing books and giving interviews,
disclosing many facts. Here are some examples of that.
Suhail Lari and Yasmin Lari live in Karachi. Coming from the upper
class and educated abroad, Lari is a researcher. They are now busy saving
the heritage of Sindh through Heritage Foundation, an organisation in
Karachi founded by them. Lari was saying, "Let me tell you what the
attitude was like at that time. Dr. Mubashir Hasan was close to Bhutto
and also became a Federal Minister during Bhutto's regime. He was with
Bhutto in Dhaka on March 25. We got to meet right after he had returned
from there. 'What's going on there?', I asked him. 'A hundred thousand or
so died in 1947 for Pakistan, may be the same number of people will die
too this time, so what?' he scoffed".
We met Dr. Mubashir Hasan in Lahore. He said about those days, "I
could feel that something was going to happen on March 25. At four in
the morning I saw the Army on the streets from my room at Hotel
Intercon. I went to Bhutto and asked him what was happening. He also
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observed the situation through the window. No one but Abdur Rahim of
PPP wanted army action" [Rahim is now deceased]. He also said, "We
did not know for a long time the injustice done towards East Pakistan.
People like us knew nothing". Dr. Mubashir Hasan was the Finance
Minister of Pakistan.
I asked Suhail, "What do the people here think about the events of
1971?"
"The general people did not know anything".
"Didn't they tune in to BBC or VOA?"
"Most probably they didn't care. They didn't even believe everything they
heard there. They thought BBC was lying. The people had a totally
closed mind."
"Didn't you know?"
"Yes, I could figure out a bit by listening to the radio". And then added
uncomfortably, "But I didn't know anything in detail".
Educated persons tend to avoid this issue. When my next question was,
"Why was there no protests?" they find it better to avoid the issue
altogether. I also put the same question to Suhail, "Didn't anyone say
anything?"
"No", he replied. "No one said anything. The only persons who said
something in public were Air Vice Marshal Asghar Khan and Ahmed
Raja Kasoori".
Abdul Gafur, the Vice President of Jamaat, said, "We have heard of what
happened on March 25. India and the non-Muslims played a significant
role in the whole affair. India was claiming that thousands of people were
dying, which was not believable". His statement is ridden with
inconsistencies. According to what he said, Mujib or Awami League
were no factors in the events of March 25 and India was in fact
responsible for everything. Was Sheikh Mujib acting as the proxy of
India? I asked him, "Then was Sheikh Mujib an agent of India?"
"No", he answered, thus contradicting the first part of his statement.
"Jamaat was involved in the murders of December 14", I said to him.
"If you say that Jamaat collaborated with the army then it is acceptable",
he said. "But it is not believable that Jamaat actually murdered people".
Did Khalid Mahmud, Associate Professor of International Relations at
Karachi University, know what happened on March 25, 1971?
"Yes I knew", he said candidly. "Half of the ownership of Meher
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Industries was ours. Our relatives who looked after the business in Dhaka
escaped home. The factory was also damaged".
Talat Nazariat, the Chairman of the same department and who joined the
department in 1971, said, "The newspapers did not give a full account of
the events of 1971. We read that the Awami league leaders had been
arrested. This enraged me. But we did not know of the bloodshed. Later
we came to know bits and pieces through the radio".
Meraj Momammad Khan, a student leader in the 70's and later a PPP
leader, said, "Bhutto returned on March 26. I was at the airport to receive
him. Coming down from the plane, he said, 'Thank God, Pakistan is
saved'. I said to myself, 'Allah miane Pakistanko mar dia' ('Allah has
destroyed Pakistan'). I accompanied Butto to his residence at Clifton.
Begum Bhutto was coming down from upsrtairs. Meeting me, she said,
'Pakistan will not be there anymore. How can Pakistan survive after
this?"
"The reaction was negative everywhere except in Punjab," went on
Meraj. "J. Rahim, the party Secretary, drafted a paper criticising the
activities of the Army in East Pakistan. The Central Committee was
having a meeting at the house of Dr. Mubashir Hasan. Secretly I
photocopied Rahim's paper and distributed it among the committee
members. This greatly angered Bhutto". Mubashir had said that Rahim
was the only person in the party who was for the Army. Probably right
after this, his position in the party began to decline.
Now let us look at the reaction of some of the people who were directly
involved with the events of March 25 and the days that followed. We
talked about this with General Umar, General Rao Farman Ali, General
Niazi, Brigadier Siddiqi and Roedad Khan.
General Umar, who was the Secretary of the Security Council at that
time, was in Dhaka on March 25. He visited Dhaka several times
between March and December 1971. We were talking to him at his
residence in Karachi. He welcomed us so warmly that it seemed that he
has found his long-lost relatives. He said that before our arrival he was
reading the Holy Quran and shedding tears. He acted like he had no idea
how it all had happened.
"Do you know anything about March 25?", I asked.
"No", he replied in an innocent manner.
"Do you know anything of what happened after March 25?"
6
"No".
"You were the Secretary of the Security Council, and you want us to
believe that you knew nothing?"
"I was a mere member secretary of the council. No meeting of the
Council was ever held, and it didn't have any power".
Rafi Raza, once a PPP activist and a close ally of Bhutto, was with
Bhutto in Dhaka on March 25. The topic came up during our discussions
at his Karachi home. He said, "How could Umar not know? We were
setting off from Dhaka. Umar boarded the plane in such a consequential
manner. He acted like he didn't know either Bhutto or me. It was as if he
didn't see anyone. And he didn't know what happened in Dhaka?"
While sipping tea in his home in Islamabad, Altaf Gauhar revealed,
"Listen, Roedad and Umar frequently went to Dhaka. After returning,
they used to come over to my place in the evening. They described to me
what was happening in Dhaka. Ask Roedad whether it is true with
confirms my reference".
Brigadier Siddiqi has also said the same. He had to keep in touch with
General Umar before and after March 25. He has said, and also has
written, that Umar was the principal political advisor of Yahya. Right
before March 25, venting his anger at the journalists of Dhaka, he told
Siddiqi, "What kind of a Public Relations Director are you that you can't
even control these bastards?"
General Farman has written his memoirs defending himself. While
interviewing him, I asked him about the genocide. "Genocide? No, there
was no genocide," He said.
"Well, were people killed between March and December?"
"Yes"
"How many died in your estimation? Thirty thousand? Forty? Fifty?"
"Yes, may be", he said, and, immediately realising his mistake, switched
to another topic.
"General", I said, "isn't the killing of fifty thousand people genocide?"
He remained silent.
"Aren't you responsible for what happened on December 14?"
"I've explained this in my book", he said.
"I've seen that book", I said. "You've said in the book that you knew
nothing. But after the fall of Dhaka a list of intellectuals was found in
your office in the Governor House".
7
"Many people used to come to me and say this person or that person had
done such and such. I used to jot down the names. That was a list of such
names".
Altaf Gauhar cited an incident when we were discussing this with him. A
friend had informed him that a list had been prepared to kill the Bangalis,
and the name of one of his friends was also in the list. Was it possible for
Altaf to do anything about it? He requested an acquaintance, who was
also an acquaintance of Farman, to meet Farman and arrange for the
removal of that name from the list. "Farman took out a list from the
drawer and cut off the name. The name was of Sanaul Haque".
We were talking to Air Marshal Asghar Khan in Islamabad. We both
began to laugh when I told him about Farman's claim that he knew
nothing of what was happening in Dhaka in 1971. Then he said softly,
"That ill-famed man. Now he is talking of philosophy and high ideals".
Niazi acted like he could not even comprehend the issue of genocide and
said he knew nothing of the killings. Most probably this was just a showoff,
because in his memoirs he has compared the military action in Dhaka
on March 25 with the campaign of Halaku Khan. On April 15, 1971,
Niazi sent a secret memorandum to the divisional commanders. The
theme of the memo was - the troops have created chaos and they were
busy raping, looting and killing. If this continues, their own [that is,
Pakistani] women would also be attacked. In his words, "It is not
uncommon in history that a battle has been lost because troops were
indulged in loot and rape". Here I am quoting the first part of the memo -
"Since my arrival, I have heard numerous reports of troops indulging in
loot and arson, killing people at random and without reasons in areas
cleared of the anti state elements; of late there have been reports of rape
and even the West Pakistanis are not being spared; on 12 April two West
Pakistani women were raped, and an attempt was made on two others".
Niazi had probably forgotten about this memo.
In 1971, Roedad Khan, a very influential man, was the Information
Secretary. He later became a Minister. It was his responsibility to tell the
outside world what was going on in Bangladesh. He was in Dhaka on
March 25.
We met him in Islamabad. He said he was totally in the dark about what
was happening in Dhaka. "No, I do not know anything of what happened.
8
I did not hear a gunfire at least from twelve midnight in the morning".
"Right opposite the Hotel Intercon, where you were staying, the office of
The People was in flames."
He had no answer to it, he just sat there with a silent gaze. "General" I
added, "That you were the first person to give the declaration on the
radio".
"General Umar is not right".
Brigadier Siddiqi has written that during that time the foreign
correspondents were asked to leave the country and the damaged image
of Pakistan is attributed to the vengeful actions of these correspondents.
But in a way it was a good thing that they were forced out, because
"Dacca, on March 26 and for several days to come, was virtually a media
men's paradise. It was the picture of death and desolation Bodies by the
roadside, every bombed buildings, barricade, tank, truck and jeep, these
were stories for the avaricious TV man and news photographer: and they
missed nearly all that".
Among all these, said Siddiqi, Roedad Khan and his men got busy
painting the image of Pakistan. Roedad even produced a documentary
named "The Great Betrayal", which cost almost a million taka of that
time. The film was processed in Brussels and dubbed in four languages-
Arabic, French, Urdu and English.
Page 31 of 182
The film mainly described the persecution of the non-Bangalis by Awami
League. A grand ceremony was arranged to show it to Yahya, but Yahya
refused to approve its release. Roedad tried to convince Yahya that the
motive of the film "Was to create guilt complex' in the mind of the
Bengalis. It was time they were faced with the grim evidence of their
crimes".
Alamdar Raza, the last Pakistani Commissioner of Dhaka, has filed a writ
petition against the Pakistan Government to publish the Hamudur
Rahman Commission Report and to punish those who were responsible
for stalling its publication in the first place. In the article 52 of the
petition he has said that Pakistan has become the laughing stock of the
world for failure to punish those who were involved with grievous
crimes. As a result, "The internal effect of this has been such that the
extra judicial and custodial killing have become a part of a national
tradition". The last comment is worth noting.
9
Alamdar Raza was explaining how the authority was delaying the
acceptance of his writ petition. Then he finally got the chance to submit
his petition at the court, and at one point he gave an example of the
barbarity of the Pakistani troops. A group of soldiers attacked a house
and killed a number of people. They kept the young girl of the family
alive to rape her. The girl pleaded that she was also a Pakistani, and she
was also a Muslim as were the soldiers. How could a Muslim rape
another Muslim woman? At last she placed the Holy Quran on the bed
and said if anyone wanted to rape her he would have to first remove the
Quran from the bed. The soldiers did that. Alamdar described that the
judge could not but shed tears after hearing this.
We did not get any reasonable answer from Benazir Bhutto to our
questions, and it is understandable that even if she did know what was
going on it would be impossible for her to say so.
So the fact is, the policy makers, and also those involved with the events
of 1971 in other capacities, knew fairly well about the real situation in
East Pakistan. But if they ever admit it, then they would have to stand for
trial - in the court of humanity if not in any official one. Of course, they
do not want it. The middle class, who were educated, also knew some of
it, but they had no idea of its extent or the terrifying reality. Rafi Raza's
comment in this regard seemed quite reasonable to me. "We didn't know
or we didn't want to know, whatever manner you take it". M. A. Naqvi
said, "Tikka Khan said that only three thousand women had been raped.
And now everyone is blaming everyone".
He said something else which had never crossed our mind- " It is claimed
that West Pakistanis did not know of the situation in East Pakistan. This
is a false government propaganda. Weren't there any transistors in those
days? Punjabi soldiers used to send back home two to three hundred taka
from their workplace. But in 1971, they started sending even five to six
hundred taka. Where did they get this extra money"?
In April Niazi mentioned in a secret memo that booty of the war were
being shipped to West Pakistan by the returning families. Not only that-
"I gather that even officers have been suspected for indulging in shameful
activity and what is worse, that in spite of repeated instructions, comdos.
have so far failed to curb this alarming state of indiscipline. I suspect that
cos and osc units/sub-units are protecting and shielding such criminals".
The bottomline is, no one in Pakistan, not even any liberal, wants to utter
10
the word genocide. They do not want to admit it in any way because the
issues like responsibility, crime and punishment may crop up
immediately following such an admittance.
But what was the nature of the war in 1971, and how was it perceived?
I talked to some students of the International Relations Department of
Karachi University. They were born after 1971. Naturally they do not
know many things, but they do have the urge to know. They said they
were starting to question what is written in the text books, and they were
getting the feeling that what the books say is not entirely correct. The text
books say that the factors responsible for breaking up Pakistan were
Sheikh Mujib, the Six Points and the Bangalis. Of course, the students do
not know that much about the genocide.
Raja Kazim is an affluent and successful lawyer in Karachi. Once
involved with the Communist Party, he still frequently mingles with
politicians. He said, "I believed that Sheikh Mujib and the Muktibahini
were on the wrong path. It was a petty bourgeois uprising and not a
revolution of the masses".
"I am not stating this after hearing the brief of Pakistan", he stressed.
"They have sent me to jail four times. What I'm saying is my own
opinion. And then when I heard the stories of the killings, plundering and
raping, I felt disturbed. I certainly did not support the army but I
remained in the darkness. I got to know the facts in more details after the
prisoners of war and others had returned. But at that time, there was no
room for contrary opinion".
Abdul Gafur of Jamaat also declared that "It was not an uprising of the
common people".
Most people see the Six Points as the manifesto for the break-up of
Pakistan. They also say how Bhutto once said that out of the Six Points,
five and a half were acceptable. But no one talks of the remaining
unacceptable half a point.
But, due to the recent situation in Pakistan, the notion about the Six
Points is changing, with the degree of change varying in different
regions. The Muhajirs, who have till recently kept on shouting in favour
of Pakistan are now asking, what kind of a Pakistan is this? This Pakistan
does not trust them. It never did. A Pakistani consultant of World Bank -
a scholarly woman - expressed her anger in a party, "They say they knew
nothing about 1971. They do not even believe that the soldiers have
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committed murders in Karachi."
The context of her comment was very interesting. In that same party, I
was talking with a calm-looking researcher. She is not a Muhajir, and the
two women were friends. The non-Muhajir woman was saying, "In 1971,
the bodies of the soldiers were brought back home, and that was when
we guessed that something must be wrong in East Pakistan. But we could
not comprehend the magnitude of it".
During a chat, a young civil service recruit told me, "There was a
question in the civil service exam - 'Discuss the Six Points'. I knew what
the Six Points were, but I didn't answer that question, because if my
answer paper had ended up in the hands of a Punjabi examiner then he
might not have liked what I'd written". Time and place are not changing
the significance of the Six Points. But Benazir Bhutto explained the
standard text on the Six Points usually put forward by the politicians. She
said, "Acceptance of the Six Points would have heralded the
disintegration of Pakistan. It would have been tantamount to granting
independence not only to Bangladesh but also to the other provinces of
Pakistan. That was why we resisted the Six Points. I feel that if the Six
Points had been into place, Pakistan would not have existed as a state
today".
Pakistanis usually avoid the words 'Liberation War', and also the word
Muktibahini, because they still see the Liberation war of Bangladesh as
an India-Pakistan war. This is only natural for the Pakistanis. It is
extremely difficult and distressing for them to admit that they had been
defeated by the Bangalis. They probably prefer to think of it as yet
another India-Pakistan war. After all, there have been several armed
conflicts between the two countries, someone has to win and someone
has to lose in these conflicts, and Pakistan lost the war in 1971; that's all.
But they did know that the policies of the military junta would ultimately
cause rebellion and war would break out. They were mentally prepared
for it. If not, then why did General Yakub chalk out Operation Blitz in
November 1970? And why would it be turned into Operation Searchlight
on March 25, 1971? They abandoned all hopes of keeping East Pakistan
right after March - at least that is how the Head Quarters felt. The idea
was to solve all the problems by crushing the Bangalis once and for all
through the Operation Searchlight. And if the Bangalis could not be
crushed, then that province could not be kept under control anyway, so it
12
is better to save Pakistan. Brigadier Siddiqi asked a quite reasonable
question - If it was required to protect East Pakistan from Indian
aggression, then why were not there enough precautions taken
beforehand? General Niazi also raised the same point.
In this context, a memo by the then Chief of General Staff Lt. General
Gul Hasan is worth mentioning- "The main battle would be fought in the
west (the Punjab). It was envisaged that the fate of East Pakistan would
hinge upon whatever operation was undertaken in the west".
Gul Hasan says in his memoir that there was no hope for keeping East
Pakistan and there was no point in wasting time by appeasing the
Bangalis there. The time was up. So it was better to give attention to
West Pakistan. Alamdar Raza also talked about this as an India-Pakistan
war, but in his writ petition he has mentioned the real cause behind the
defeat of Pakistan - "The fact of the matter is that Pakistan army lost in a
people's war. No army in the world has ever won fighting against the
people".
"Our greatest tragedy was that we didn't take any lesson from even a
disaster as big as this", said Alamdar Raza. "We have directed all our
resources in saving the persons responsible for the debacle. Yahya Khan
was given a full military burial. The Hamudur Rahman Khan
Commission report was never published. The 195, against whom there
are adequate proof of their crimes, were never punished".
Only a handful of men publicly protested against the army action in
Bangladesh in 1971. I have already mentioned some of them. Ahmed
Selim wrote a poem speaking against the activities of the army.
Ahmed Selim and some of his companions were arrested. Selim told us
that a big collection can be published by accumulating all the poems and
songs against the genocide written in Sindh, Punjab and Baluchistan. No
one knows this. Habib Jalebi, the famous poet, was thrown to jail for
speaking against the genocide.
In Lahore, Tahera Mazhar organised a rally to voice their disapproval of
the army action. There were some protests at the individual level, about
which we do not know much. For instance, Dr. Tariq Rahman, an army
cadet in 1971, resigned right after he received commission. He would
have faced a court martial, but was saved because his father was aBrigadier. Now he teaches at the Quaed-e-Azam University in Islamabad.
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We also talked to him in Islamabad. He was saying in a calm voice,
"There was nothing courageous about it. I could not defy humanity". In
the concluding lines of the Introduction of a book by Ahmed Selim, Tariq
has written in a more eloquent form what he told me in Islamabad. He
has called on everyone to remember the grim reality of 1971 and to ask
for forgiveness to the dead. He has called for compromise and
forgiveness. This, he says, will not alter the past but may change the
course of the future. He hopes that this would help create a strong bond
with Bangladesh, which is important for avoiding the creation of another
Bangladesh. He says this in the backdrop of the violence and separatist
attitude that have recently erupted in Pakistan.
I have already mentioned to I. A. Rahman, the journalist. He speaks his
opinion just as strongly as he did in those days. He told me that we
Muslims have killed more Muslims than did Hindus and the British.
What he said is true. But how many have the courage to pronounce the
truth like this?
Page 36 of 182
I. A. Rehman said, "Many say that the people here did not know what
was happening in 1971. These are lame excuses. They more or less knew
it, because they supported the massacre of their compatriots in the eastern
wing. With a very few honourable exceptions, the West Pakistani
population, led by politicians, academics, bureaucrats, and opinion
makers, chose to back the senseless carnage, and there were many who
fought over the spoils".
He also said that it is impossible to put up any logical justification for the
war of 1971. A clique in Islamabad declared the war fully knowing that
they would lose it. Actually, their very objective was to lose the war. "It
was a betrayal of the officers and men of the Pakistan army in that they
were deceived into giving their lives for an issue, whose adverse outcome
had already been determined by their supreme commander. And no
justification could be placed before the people. The rules of combat do
not apply in this case".
Following this line of thought, some have said that the conflict was not
required at all. It would have been easier to say, "Look, we can't seem to
get along. Why don't we just separate?" Today, after all that had
happened, this is the thinking now; but this thought never occurred to
anyone 28 years ago.
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Finally, there is Sheikh Mujib, the hero of the Liberation War. How is he
perceived in Pakistan? In 1971, they branded him as a traitor. Let me
give an example. These days Roedad Khan says with an innocent look
that he does not know anything and he respects Sheikh Mujib. But what
did he say in 1971? Brigadier Siddiqi described the incident to me; he has
also included it in his book. Yahya asked in a meeting with his advisors
whether Mujib should be hanged after or without a trial. Roedad was in
favour of hanging without any trial. Prior to that, when Mujib was
brought to Pakistan as a prisoner, Roedad strongly opined that the captive
Mujib should be photographed and the picture should be circulated in the
newspapers. In Roedad's words, "Let the world know that the bastard is
in our hands".
The last 28 years have changed some of these notions. No one calls him a
traitor now, but he is one of the three men widely held responsible for the
break-up of Pakistan. He is usually allocated the third place, the first two
places being reserved for Yahya and Bhutto. Even Benazir Bhutto said
that Mujib was very affectionate towards her. Without any trace of doubt
in her voice, she said, "Mujib was even prepared to die for his principles.
And that is why his death shook us so much".
Lastly, let us look into a comment of I. A. Rehman. In the backdrop of
the hostile relationship among the three nations of the sub-continent, his
comment carries much significance. But I personally think that most
people will still be unable to realise it. He said, "We are sons of the
Himalayas. But the Himalayas will not remain forever, and neither shall
we. We should act keeping this in our mind".
